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serves to divide the gift into an equal number of portions at the
time of the gift. But a gift mortis causa can only take effect in
the future, at which time it shall be divided "share and share
alike" among the legatees capable of taking. By the mere
fact that deceased left a will, it must be presumed that he intended to die testate as to all of his property, unless there are
words to the contrary in the testament.
The intention of the testator is of prime importance in the
interpretation of acts of last will. As stated in Article 1712 of
the Civil Code, 7 the testator's intention "must principally be endeavored to be ascertained, without departing, however, from
the proper signification of the terms of the testament." The average layman knows little of the technical distinctions of such
phrases. If it is possible to ascertain his intention without reference to those distinctions, it would seem that the rules of testamentary construction would require that this be done. Otherwise,
the rules laid down in the Code for the purpose of safeguarding
every individual right in the matter of distribution of estates

would be lost.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

MARTHA

INTERSTATE COMMERCE -

E. KIRK

SEGREGATION

STATuTEs-Appellant, a negro woman who was traveling interstate in Virginia on a motor common carrier, refused to accede
to a request of the driver to move to the back seat to permit
white passengers to be seated.1 She was arrested, tried and convicted under a Virginia segregation statute. 2 This act required
designation of separate seating space for white and negro passengers, directed the driver "at any time when it may be necessary or proper for the comfort and convenience of the passengers
so to do, to change the designation so as to increase or decrease
the amount of space or seats set apart for either race," and made
refusal to take a seat assigned by the driver a misdemeanor.4 On
a writ of error the conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia. 5 Held, reversed. Seating arrangements
for the different races in interstate motor travel require a single,
7. La. Civil Code of 1870.

1. Six white passengers were standing, while there were two vacant
spaces on the long rear seat. Appellant was sitting in the second seat toward
the front from the long seat in the extreme rear of the bus.
2. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) §§ 4097z, 4097aa, 4097bb, 4097cc, 4097dd.

3. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 4097bb.
4. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 4097dd.

5. 184 Va. 24, 34 S.E.(2d) 491 (1945).
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uniform rule to promote and protect national travel.6 Morgan v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 66 S. Ct. 1050, 90 L.Ed. 982 (U.
S. 1946).
This is an extraordinary case. The appellant's real interest
lay in fair and equal treatment as a bus passenger. 7 Her counsel,
however, were astute enough to stand on the commerce clause
rather than civil rights. The upshot was a decision of importance
with respect to the distribution of powers within the federal
system, a decision made against a state in favor of federal power
although the federal government was not represented in the case.
The effect was to repudiate the position of the political branches
of the government on the subject without hearing."
In the field of state regulation of carriers, there have been
many decisions holding that where Congress has not acted a
state may validly enact legislation which has only a local influence on the course of interstate commerce." However, state
regulation will fall if considered an undue burden upon interstate
commerce. Furthermore, where the subject, in the opinion of
the Supreme Court, requires uniform treatment in a national
6. Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred in the result; Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred separately, assigning reasons; Mr. Justice
Burton dissented, with opinion. The vacancy due to the death of Mr. Chief
Justice Stone had not been filled.
7. It seems to the writer that there are more practical problems affecting the safety and speed of bus travel which, as a strictly commerce matter,
overshadow the segregation factor. Buses are designed for operation by one
man. The key to this arrangement is a single door at the front under the
eye of the driver. Were an additional regular door installed at the rear and
a conductor required to handle the passengers, would not the result be
greater security for the passengers and a reduction in time consumed by
the taking on and discharge of passengers? There is, of course, the problem
of rate adjustment to meet increased costs, which would complicate the
competitive situation. The answer is that the public interest is supreme.
8. On four occasions, segregation bills have not even reached the floor.
In 1938, I.R. 8821 [83 Cong. Rec. 74 (1938)] was introduced to amend 49
U.S.C. § 3(1)(1929) to forbid segregation. The bill was not reported out of
committee. In 1939, a similar bill was introduced as H.R. 182 [84 Cong. Rec.
27 (1939)] and was not reported out. Again in 1941, such a bill was reintroduced as H.R. 112 [87 Cong. Rec. 13 (1941)] and for the third time, it was
not reported out. Similarly, H.R. 1925, introduced in 1945 [91 Cong. Rec. 749
(1945)] was not reported out of committee.
9. Hennington v. State of Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 16 S.Ct. 1086, 41 LEd.
166 (1896); New York, N.H. & H. Railroad Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628,
17 S.Ct. 418, 41 LEd. 853 (1897); Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 548, 71
LEd. 966 (1927); Terminal R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
318 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943).
10. Kansas City Southern R.R. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District, 233
U.S. 75, 34 S.Ct. 564, 58 L.Ed. 857 (1914); South Covington & C. St. Ry. v.
Covington, 235 U.S. 537, 35 S.Ct. 158, 59 I. Ed. 350, L.R.A. 1915F 792 (1915);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 89 L.Ed. 1915
(1945).
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sense, it has been the established theory for nearly a century that
the states are without jurisdiction over it."
The concluding sentences of the majority opinion are couched
in the language of the uniform rule formula. Nevertheless, in
reaching this conclusion, there is much discussion of the burden
on interstate commerce which results from the constant shifting
of seats permitted under the Virginia statute. Mr. Justice Burton,
in dissenting, insisted that the
"basic weakness in the appellant's case is the lack of facts
and findings essential to demonstrate the existence of such
a serious and major burden upon the national interest in
interstate commerce as to outweigh whatever state or local
benefits are attributable to the statute and which would be
lost by its invalidation.1

12

Perhaps the majority's discussion of these burdens and conflicting state statutes was not in balancing state police power objectives with national interests in commerce, but rather in
determining whether segregation was a subject on which there
must be a uniform rule.
Though the facts of the principal case confine the decision
to a situation involving (1) interstate motor common carriers and
(2) a state statute permitting the shifting about of passengers,
the broad language used in the opinion suggests wider implications.
The first question raised by this decision is whether the
requirement of a uniform rule invalidates all interstate bus segre13
gation statutes. A careful consideration of the Louisiana statute
does not appear to give the bus driver the right to shift the
passengers about constantly. Thus, the Louisiana passengers are
not subject to the same burdens permitted under the Virginia
law. Nevertheless, the basic reasoning of the majority opinion
would appear to undermine all state segregation statutes.
There is a possible private adjustment of the problem. The
Court may approve, as to motor carriers, the rule now in effect
as to segregation of interstate passengers on railroad coaches.
Congressional inaction there is deemed equivalent to a declara11. Cooley v. Board -of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 13 L.Ed. 299 (1851); The
Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 33 S.Ct. 729, 57
L.Ed. 1511 (1913); Kelley v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 87, 82 L.Ed.
3 (1937).
12. 66 S.Ct. 1050, 1061, 90 L.Ed. 982, 992 (U.S. 1946).
13. La. Act 209 of 1928, § 1, 2 [Dart's Stats. .(1939) §§ 5307, 5308].
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tion that a carrier may, by its regulations, separate white and

4
negro interstate passengers.1

Assuming all state segregation statutes unconstitutional as
to interstate passengers, another problem is presented. Would
the holding of the principal case preclude segregation as to intrastate transportation? If the decision should be limited to interstate passengers, an interstate white passenger could occupy the
rear seat with an intrastate negro passenger, and the converse
would be true. The result would be less uniformity than would
be possible under a segregation statute applicable to both interstate and intrastate passengers. And yet it would be a big step
to the conclusion that state regulation as to intrastate passengers
would be invalid even in the absence of congressional action on
the subject. 15 A more supportable position would be that Congress
could extend its regulation to intrastate travel in order to effectu1
ate interstate regulation.

6

Again, how will this decision affect other modes of travel?
As to segregation on trains, it is well settled that a state segregation statute limited to intrastate passengers is valid." The
Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the validity of a
state segregation statute as to interstate railroad passengers 8
The reasoning of the principal case indicates that such a state
regulation would be unconstitutional. It is to be noted, however,
14. Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 218 U.S. 71. 30 S.Ct. 667, 54 L.Ed.
936, 20 Ann. Cas. 980 (1910). Note that the carrier had its own segregation
rules in the Morgan case, but the only question raised in the appeal was the
validity of the statute itself. 66 S.Ct. 1050, 1052, 1053, 90 L.Ed. 982, 983, 984
(U. S. 1946).
15. Such a conclusion would be contrary to the recognized rule regarding intrastate segregation on the railroads. See cases cited infra note 17.
16. The Shreveport Rate Cases (Houston E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United
States), 234 U.S. 342, 34 S.Ct. 833, 58 L.Ed. 1341 (1914); Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 42 S.Ct. 232, 66 L.Ed. 371 (1922).17. Louisville, N.O. & T. R.R. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 10 S.Ct. 348, 33
L.Ed. 784 (1890); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256
(1896); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 235 U.S. 151, 35 S.Ct. 69, 59 L.Ed.
169 (1914); State ex rel. Abbott v. Hicks, 44 La. Ann. 770, 11 So. 74 (1892).
18. Cases interpreting Supreme Court decisions to permit state segregation statutes as applied to interstate passengers: Alabama & V. R.R. v.
Morris, 103 Miss. 511, 60 So. 11, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 613 (1912), writ of error
dismissed on motion of counsel for plaintiff In error, 234 U.S. 766, 34 S.Ct.
675, 58 L. Ed. 1582 (1913); Southern R.R. v. Norton, 112 Miss. 302, 73 So. 1
(1916); Smith v. State, 100 Tenn. 494, 46 S.W. 566, 41 I.R.A. 432 (1898), writ
of error dismissed 21 S.Ct. 917, 45 L.Ed. 1256 (U.S. 1900).
Cases interpreting Supreme Court decisions to outlaw segregation laws
as to interstate passengers: Anderson v. Louisville & N. R.R., 62 Fed. 46
(C.C. Ky. 1894); State ex rel. Abbott v. Hicks, 44 La. Ann. 770, 11 So. 74
(1892); Carrey v. Spencer, 36 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1895); Hart v. State, 100 Md.
595, 60 AtI. 457 (1905); State v. Jenkins, 124 Md. 376, 92 Atl. 773 (1914).
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that the rule that the railroad carrier itself may segregate is still
applicable to interstate as well as intrastate passengers. 9
Pullman and air line carriers, who are required, of course,
to accommodate both races, 20 would be faced with a more serious
burden than that in the instant case if forced to make provisions
for separate accommodations. 2 1 In these cases, segregation, it
would appear, is so impracticable as to render translation into a
legal requirement out of the question.
In conclusion, a consideration of whether Congress could
prescribe less than a nationally uniform rule for motor common
carriers deserves comment. Taken literally, the language of Mr.
Justice Reed's opinion 22 would reflect doubt upon an act of Congress providing for segregation in the southern states and nonsegregation in other states. This troubled Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who was at pains to point out, in concurring, that "Congress may effectively exercise its power under the Commerce
23
Clause without the necessity of a blanket rule for the country."
MINOS D. MILLER, JR.
DONATIONS INTER VIVOS-MANUAL GIFTS-FORMALITIES REQUIRED--Mrs. Gorman, after being confined to the hospital, executed a power of attorney authorizing the defendant, a half sister, to
withdraw her money from the bank. The evidence showed that
Mrs. Gorman gave the defendant certain jewelry and her bankbook with the understanding that the jewelry and such money
as was left after payment of bills would be a gift to the defendant. The defendant withdrew the money from the bank during
the lifetime of Mrs. Gorman, paid her hospital bills and retained
the balance as her own. In her will Mrs. Gorman left all her
19. Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 218 U.S. 71, 30 S.Ct. 667, 54 LEd.

936, 20 Ann. Cas. 980 (1910).
20. 54 Stat. 902 (1940), 49 U.S.C.A. § 3(1)

(Supp. 1945). As to dining car

service, see Henderson v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 906 (D. C. Md. 1945).
21. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 61 S.Ct. 873, 85 L.Ed. 1201 (1941)
(where a negro traveling interstate recovered damages because he was forced
by the conductor to move from his pullman to a coach provided for negro
passengers, In purported compliance with an Arkansas statute requiring
segregation).
22. Only two justices concurred in the majority opinion. Supra note 6.
23. He relied upon Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R.R., 242

U.S. 311, 37 S.Ct. 180, 61 L.Ed. 326, I.R.A. 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845
(1917); and Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 56 S.Ct. 532, 80 L.Ed. 778 (1936)
to support the theory that Congress may devise a national policy with due
regard to varying interests of different regions. While that theory doubtless
underlies those decisions, It should be noted that both involved federal im-

plementation of state law (one as to liquor and the other as to convict-made
goods), and not primary federal regulation.

